Managing the allocation of shelf space for new products is a problem of significant importance for retailers. The problem is particularly complex for exhibitors-the retailers in the motion picture supply chain-because they face dynamic challenges, given the short life cycles of movies, the changing level of demand over time, the scarcity of shelf space, and the complex revenue sharing contract between the exhibitor and the distributor. In the face of this complexity, the aim of current research is to provide a structure for analyzing management problems of exhibitors in the movie industry. Using a mathematical programming approach and a fast, but readily accessible algorithm, we propose a decision support model, SilverScreener, whose aim is to help exhibitors make effective and timely decisions regarding theater screens management. The major objective is to help select and schedule movies for a multiple-screens theater over a fixed planning horizon in such a way that the exhibitor's cumulative profit is maximized.
• Based on SilverScreener's recommendations, the exhibitor can achieve substantially higher cumulative profit.
• The improvement over actual decisions in terms of profitability appears to result from a combination of better selection and scheduling of the movies.
• The general structure of the exhibitor's normative decision is: choose fewer "right" movies and run them longer.
We propose a two-tier integrated application of the model to show how the model can be applied to realistic decision making. The first tier involves development of a movie selection plan to help the manager plan an entire season and bid for movies before the start of that season. An ex ante revenue prediction scheme is developed, based intuitively on a matching of the forthcoming movies with similar movies played in this theater previously. If the forthcoming season's scheduling plan can be visualized as a two-dimensional (week-byscreen) matrix, then that matrix contains only "empty cells" before the first tier. After a bid plan is developed, the exhibitor can "fill" some of those empty cells. The remaining empty cells represent slots, which can be decided during the season by either extending movies the exhibitor booked before the season or by scheduling other movies which may become available later in the season. This motivates the second tier-adaptive scheduling approach-of the integrated approach. The second tier helps the exhibitor in weekly decision making during the season. This application involves "rolling," and updating data, from one time window to another. The approaches followed in the two tiers of the integrated application are quite general in that they can incorporate a sophisticated demand prediction model, managerial judgments, or a combination of both. We also propose an alternative behavioral decision rule (heuristic), which exemplifies relationship dilemmas in the movie industry. This heuristic shows that the exhibitors need to be selective in their choice of movies and may suffer a substantial loss in profitability if they place too much emphasis on accommodating distributors. (Movies; Decision Support Systems; Retailing; Scheduling; Integer Programming) 
Introduction
Retailing is becoming an increasingly important area of management attention and academic research. Much of the research has focused on the strategic aspects of retail management-both within the distribution channel and between retailers (or retailermanufacturer systems)-but another important area has been the development of decision support models to help retailers improve their decision making. For example, Bultez and Naert's (1988) SHARP model helps retailers decide on shelf space allocations and Abraham and Lodish's (1993) PROMOTIONSCAN system helps managers in developing and evaluating short-term retail promotions. Our work is in a similar spirit to these models; its aim is to help retailers improve their decision making.
Most published research in this area focuses on consumer packaged goods sold through supermarkets. However, other retail formats and industry settings pose different challenges and intriguing problems. We focus on products, which have relatively short life cycles, so that effective retail management requires regular attention to the issue of which products should be stocked. In particular, we concentrate on the motion picture industry, though other entertainment (e.g., books, video games) and fashion goods industries have similar characteristics.
The motion picture industry is emerging as an area of increased interest to marketing scholars and researchers. A stream of research, addressing various aspects related to the marketing of movies, has begun to emerge in the marketing literature. At the consumer behavior level, some of the research has questioned the relevance of the traditional information-seeking framework for studying the consumption of movies (e.g., . Another stream of research has focused on forecasting the enjoyment of movies at the individual level (Eliashberg and Sawhney 1994) as well as forecasting the commercial success of movies at the aggregate level (Smith and Smith 1986 , Austin and Gordon 1987 , Dodds and Holbrook 1988 , Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996 , Eliashberg and Shugan 1997 . Additionally, some research has begun to emerge addressing diffusion (Mahajan et al. 1984, Jones and Ritz 1991) , seasonality (Radas and Shugan 1998) , release timing , clustering (Jedidi et al. 1998) , sequential products (Lehmann and Weinberg 1998, Prasad et al. 1998) , contract design (Swami et al. 1998) , and the impact of advertising (Zufryden 1996) , all in the context of motion pictures.
There are more than 300 exhibitors in the U.S. and Canada. Though the total number of theater screens owned by these exhibitors has remained relatively constant in the last five years, the total number of mass market movies released by the major studios, especially during the summer peak season, seems to be rising steadily. This trend suggests that movies' distributors (i.e., studios) will face limited screen availability for their films, while exhibitors will have to manage their bookings and screens very effectively to maintain and improve profitability. In reviewing the situation for the summer of 1997, a Wall Street Journal article comments:
After an epic binge on production of big-budget movies, the film industry now faces a glut of expensive "event" pictures and too few summer weekend slots to release them all. . .
[There] aren't enough movie screens to keep big films running for the months they need to recoup their costs. By July 4th, 1997, many are predicting gridlock. Films that are performing only moderately well will likely be scaled back in favor of the new releases. (Bannon 1997, p. B1) A theater owner with an objective of effective screens management thus faces a complex scenario. The complexity comes from various sources. First, the increased supply of movies by various studios increases the difficulty of deciding which movie to play. This decision is further complicated because it is made for a number of screens in a multiple screens theater (i.e., a multiplex). Second, an additional supply of movies brings more pressure from the studios to guarantee sufficient playtime for their movies. Relationship management in the motion picture industry is considered by many as very crucial. On the other hand, the scarcity of "shelf space" requires special attention in managing the screens effectively and profitably. Third, the nature of the distributor-exhibitor contract in the motion picture industry is unique. In signing a contract to play a film in its theaters, the exhibitor becomes obligated to play the film for a certain period of time, even when consumer demand is weak. This minimum obligation period (playtime), which is negotiated between the two parties, may vary by movie as well as by studio. The financial arrangements between studios and exhibitors are also apparently unique to the motion picture industry. Unlike wholesale/retail pricing practices commonly employed in the consumer goods industry, box-office grosses are split between the exhibitors and distributors of motion pictures. The manner in which the box-office grosses are split favors the studio (distributors) in the first few weeks of the movie playing, but shifts to the exhibitor's favor later on. Distributors thus have a strong incentive to promote the movies intensively in their initial play period. On the other hand, the longer the exhibitor plays the movie, the larger becomes his/her share of the box-office receipts. At the same time, theater attendance for a movie typically declines the longer it plays.
In the face of this complexity, the aim of current research is to provide a structure for analyzing management problems of exhibitors, the retailers of the movie industry. Using a mathematical programming approach and a fast, but readily accessible algorithm, we propose a decision support model to help the exhibitor make effective and timely decisions regarding theater screens management. The major objective is to help the exhibitor both select and schedule movies at his/her theater. The developed model is readily implementable, as we demonstrate in an illustrative example, and appears to lead to improved profitability. An integrated two-tier application of the model is presented to show how the model can be used as an effective managerial aid. Through sensitivity analysis, the results are shown to be robust to various parameters of the problem. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The screens management model, SilverScreener, its properties, and solution procedures are presented in the next section. An illustrative application of the model and implications for screens management policy are given in §3. We provide concluding remarks and suggest directions for further research in §4.
Problem Formulation and
Modeling Approach 2.1. The Exhibitor Problem Every week, motion picture exhibitors must make an important decision regarding the replacement of the movies playing at the screens in their theaters. Movies are a seasonal product, both demand and supply increase in the two key seasons, Summer and Christmas. The dynamic environment thus induced gives rise to the notions of decay and aging of movies. Decay is the intrinsic weekly decline in the box-office attraction and gross revenues (grosses in industry jargon) of a movie playing at a theater . Aging is the decline in the value, that is, gross generating power, of a movie from an exhibitor's perspective if there is a delay (by week) in exhibiting the movie at the theater. Aging, therefore, results in an opportunity cost of not being able to play a particular movie. The above scenario is further complicated by the nature of the contract between the distributor and the exhibitor. The basic structure of the contract is fairly standard between different distributor-exhibitor pairs although the individual terms may vary depending on the relationship between the two parties. A typical exhibition contract states a fixed obligation period and a differential revenue sharing scheme in different weeks between the distributor and the exhibitor. The obligation period limits the ability of an exhibitor to replace a movie with less than satisfactory box-office performance in the initial weeks after its release.
1
In a given week, the revenue sharing scheme splits the gross of a movie between a distributor and exhibitor by one of two rules: (a) 90%/10% over house nut, 2 or (b) minimum gross percentage. If the 90%/10% over house nut rule operates, then the distributor receives 90% of the gross after the exhibitor has deducted and retained the house nut amount. Accordingly, under this rule, the exhibitor keeps 10% of the gross over The obligation period may range from two to ten weeks depending on the respective bargaining power of the distributor and exhibitor and the marketability of a particular movie.
2
House nut is a small negotiated amount, which the exhibitor receives from the distributor. It does not necessarily bear any relationship to the theater's actual expenses, and is only meant to allow for some cushion in the exhibitor's profit margins.
house nut plus the house nut amount. The exhibition contract also contains minimum percentage figures as specified by the distributor for every week of the expected play length of a movie. These figures will be used if the minimum gross percentage rule is invoked for revenue sharing. Under this rule, the whole gross amount (without house nut deduction) is split according to the specified minimum percentage for that week. The splitting terms (in favor of distributor and exhibitor, respectively) specified by the distributor under a typical contract may appear as follows (see, for example, Squire (1992, p. 315) In addition to the revenue earned from the box-office gross, the exhibitor also earns some income from concession sales such as popcorn, candies, and soft drinks. The concession sales, however, depend on individual demands generated by the movies playing at the theater. The exhibitor does not share the concession income with the distributor. Most theaters have multiple movies playing at multiple screens. Given the complexity of the revenue sharing scheme and the dynamics of movie availability and decision making, the managers of such multiplexes are faced with nontrivial decisions of selecting and scheduling movies on different screens in a fixed planning horizon. In the next subsection, we present a mathematical model which aims at helping managers address the above problem.
SilverScreener: The Screens Management
Model 2.2.1. Assumptions. We formulate the exhibitor problem of the previous section as an integer program.
To simplify the exposition, we assume the following:
3 If a movie grossed $10,000 in the second week of its run and the house nut was $5,000, the distributor would receive $6,000 (60% of $10,000), which is greater than $4,500 (90% of ($10,000-$5,000)). Assumptions 1, 3, and 5 are not limiting and, in fact, reflect current industry practice. Assumption 2 is a strong assumption about a priori knowledge of movie revenues. However, we relax this assumption partially in the empirical analysis section. Moreover, data collected from Variety suggest that managers have a reasonable estimate of box-office gross revenue of a movie. In the empirical analysis section, we show how the forecast data can be incorporated in our optimization model using an adaptive approach. We also discuss an ex ante revenue prediction scheme that can be used in conjunction with our optimization model. We assume equal capacity screens for the current analysis (Assumption 4), which addresses the questions regarding which movies to pick and how long to show them. This is done for the simplicity of the current analysis. In the last section, we discuss how this assumption can be relaxed in future work. 
Problem Formulation.
Motivation. The formulation of the exhibitor problem is similar to the parallel machine scheduling problems (Baker 1993 , Pinedo 1995 . The usual setting of these problems is as follows. A set of N jobs has to be scheduled on H parallel machines. Each job j, (j ‫ס‬ 1, . . . ,N), must be processed without interruption during a period of length OPD j . A machine can handle no more than one job at a time, and is continuously available from time zero onwards. Each job j has a release date r j and a due date d j , the time by which it should ideally be completed. The goal is to find an optimal feasible schedule, that is, a set of start times such that the capacities, availability and time limit constraints are met, and a given objective function is optimized.
A special case of these problems is when all of the parallel machines are identical in terms of their capacities, and the processing period is restricted to be at least OPD j . When applied to the exhibitor problem, the analogy is obvious: the screens are machines and movies are jobs. Each job (i.e., movie) has its own release date r j . Except for a few special cases, we assume that all the movies have a common due date, end-of-thehorizon, W. However, the framework is flexible to incorporate movie specific due dates. This flexibility allows the exhibitor to book certain slots for precommitments and still arrive at an optimal feasible schedule for the rest of the planning horizon. We use this property of the modeling framework in our empirical analysis section to specify a movie bidding plan for the exhibitor.
Time-Indexed Formulation. We depart from the typical parallel machine scheduling problems by introducing the time-indexed formulation (Sousa and Wolsey 1992, Williams 1997 ) that is particularly useful for solving the exhibitor problem. This formulation is based on the idea of dividing the planning horizon [0, . . . ,W] into W discrete intervals of unit length. To model the screen management problem, we define a binary variable, x jiw , which equals 1 if movie j is shown for i weeks beyond its obligation period starting in week w of the planning horizon, and 0 otherwise. Notice that the obligation period constraint is included in the definition of x jiw itself. For example, if the obligation period of Movie Number 3 is two weeks, then x 301 ‫ס‬ 1 implies that it is shown for two weeks starting in week 1. This formulation can also be generalized to encompass such extensions as screen capacities, precedence constraints between movies, and movies' specific due dates.
The time-indexed formulation highlights some key differences between the exhibitor problem and typical machine scheduling problems. First, all movies do not have to be played in the exhibitor problem, while all jobs have to be scheduled in the machine scheduling problems. Accordingly, the proposed formulation is aimed at helping the exhibitor decide about two critical decision variables: choice of movies to play and deciding play lengths of the chosen movies. Second, the following types of decision-making goals are found to be prevalent in machine scheduling problems: turnaround, timeliness, and throughput. In contrast, the exhibitor problem offers a situation in which the scheduling decisions directly affect profitability, a more relevant decision-making goal, both by affecting gross revenue and concession profits. Finally, the main parameters of interest in machine scheduling are the lengths of the jobs, and their release and due dates. The exhibitor problem, on the other hand, deals with additional variables such as complicated contract terms and an exponentially decaying demand function.
Profit Function. We define P jiw , the total profit the exhibitor receives corresponding to each x jiw , as:
where h jw is a logical condition given by
‫ס‬ maximum possible number of weeks movie j can be shown beyond its obligation period starting in r j or any feasible week thereafter, and SCR ji ‫ס‬ OPD j ‫ם‬ i ‫ס‬ total screening period for movie j if it is shown for i weeks beyond its obligation period, where i ‫ס‬ 0, . . . ,k j .
The expression for the profit to the exhibitor consists of two portions corresponding to the two different conditions of the contract terms. The two conditions, operationalized by the logical variable I, follow directly from the revenue sharing terms described earlier. In addition, there are variables for fixed and variable costs. Fixed costs (e.g., rent, lights, and weekly maintenance) are the costs that the exhibitor has to incur irrespective of the traffic generated by the movies playing in a particular week. Variable costs, such as salaries of the temporary staff hired for a particular movie, vary by movies as well as weeks.
The above operationalization of P jiw simplifies the solution procedure considerably since they can now be computed independently of the optimization routine. Furthermore, the variables k j and SCR ji help us "cover" all feasible (P, x) pairs for a movie. For example, suppose movie j has parameters: OPD j ‫ס‬ 2, r j ‫ס‬ 1, and d j ‫ס‬ 4. If the movie is scheduled in Week 1 (i.e., w ‫ס‬ 1), then it can be shown for 2, 3 or 4 weeks, that is, for 0, 1 or 2 weeks beyond the obligation period. We now show how variables k j and SCR ji parsimoniously capture these possibilities. Since k j ‫ס‬ 2, i varies from 0 to 2. The corresponding values of SCR ji ‫ס(‬ 2 ‫ם‬ i) are 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Therefore, the corresponding (P, x) pairs are (P j01 , x j01 ), (P j11 , x j11 ), and (P j21 , x j21 ), respectively.
Demand Function. We use the following twoparameter exponentially declining function to estimate box-office gross revenue. Consistent with the empirical results in Krider and Weinberg (1998) , Lehmann and Weinberg (1998) , and Sawhney and Eliashberg (1996) , as well as our own empirical analysis presented in the next section, the exponential function appears to be a reasonable model of the revenue patterns of most major movies:
where ␣ j Ͼ 0 and b j Ͻ 0 are opening and decay factors respectively of movie j and ⑀ ϳ normal (0, r 2 ). Specific approaches to estimating GROSS jw are discussed in the empirical analysis section.
The reader may note that the revenue generating function employed does not explicitly incorporate competitive effects among movie theaters. This assumption, made to aid model development, is consistent with some empirical evidence (Davis 1998 ) that suggests that there exists geographic market power in the film-exhibition industry and that consumers are willing to spend a limited amount of effort to travel to watch a movie (even a blockbuster). Moreover, the estimated cross price elasticities of demand between theaters are low and decline as the distance between theaters increases (Davis 1998) , suggesting that for theaters which charge the same price, the competition is even less intensive. In fact, the Justice Department has recently launched an investigation into monopoly issues in the theater business (Orwall and Lipman 1999, p. B9) . Such an environment makes any incorporation of competitive behavior into a forecast to be of limited value from an accuracy standpoint. At the general level of specification of the model in the current study, therefore, we implicitly assume that to the extent competitive effects exist, either from other theaters or alternative forms of entertainment, they are summarized in the demand parameters or randomly affect the error term in the demand function. However, the sources of such effects may be so varied that it would be difficult to estimate with any accuracy and include them in the current framework. The consideration of such effects raises interesting theoretical issues for future research, which are discussed in the concluding section.
Problem Statement. Based on the above discussion, the time-indexed formulation of the exhibitor problem is presented as follows:
w‫ס‬r j subject to
jiw In the above model, (3) denotes the objective function, which is to maximize cumulative profit over the season. Constraint (4) ensures that a movie is played in only consecutive weeks. It also allows a movie not to be scheduled at all. The next constraint restricts the total number of movies scheduled in any week of the planning horizon to the total number of screens in the multiplex. In doing so, it sums up all the movies, which are released earlier than or in the week under consideration. The set of inequalities denoted by Constraint (6) is an indexing constraint, which restricts the variable q j in Constraint (5) to feasible values. Constraint (7) defines x jiw to be a binary variable. We coded the above model in AMPL (Fourer et al. 1993 ), a modeling language for mathematical programming.
5
Our model can be applied to realistic decision making in two different ways. The first is for developing a master plan by a one-shot application of the model. The resulting schedule can help the exhibition managers plan and bid for selected movies before the start of a season. The second instance of the model's application can be for weekly decisions, possibly after the development of the bidding plan. This adaptive application involves "rolling" from one time window (i.e., a week) to another and focuses on decisions about whether or not a movie should continue to be shown. These applications of the model can be compared to other plausible decision making rules (heuristics) that the exhibitors may use. The next section presents an empirical analysis of exhibitor decision making and is organized as follows. We first choose a representative theater and derive normative policy implications using the data collected for that theater. We then present an integrated application of the model, combining the master plan and rolling horizon approaches. Finally, we compare the model's performance with a behavioral heuristic.
A Case Study of the 84th St. Sixplex in New York
The 84th St. Sixplex is a six-screen theater, located at 84th Street and Broadway in New York City's Upper West Side. We collected the empirical data for this theater from Variety (1989). We chose this theater for the following reasons. It is a reasonable size theater, and usually plays first-run movies. It faced a minimal level of competition from the theaters in its vicinity. 6 Moreover, it is one of the few theaters in New York whose data for the year 1989 are publicly available in Variety. The year 1989 was chosen because the contract terms of a major movie in 1989, Batman, are available from 5 The analysis can be conducted on an Intel Pentium class computer. Thus, the model formulation allows for user-friendly implementation. The time taken to solve such problems was of the order of a few seconds. 6 Except for a small theater with two screens and less than 20% of the Sixplex's capacity, there were no other first-run theaters north of 70th St. on Manhattan's West Side. Squire (1992) . Since Batman was played by this theater, we use its contract terms as representative of those of the other movies. Specifically, the data items used in the following analyses and their respective sources are as follows:
1. Schedule of the movies actually played (see Table  1 ) by the theater (Source: "Domestic Box-Office" data from Variety).
2. Gross revenues generated by the movies actually played at the theater (Source: "Domestic Box-Office" data from Variety).
3. One-week ahead gross revenue forecasts for the movies actually played at the theater (Source: "Domestic Box-Office" data from Variety).
4. House nut amounts (Source: "Domestic BoxOffice" data from Variety).
5. Costs (variable and fixed) and concession profits (Source: "Financial Statements" of major theater chains from Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings on the Internet).
The actual schedule followed by the exhibitor for the 27 weeks of the planning horizon is given in Table 2A .
As shown in the table, the theater showed a total of 43 different movies. There are a number of movies with play length of one or two weeks. In addition, three movies, Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade (IJ), Star Trek V (ST5), and Batman (B), were double-booked, that is, played simultaneously on two screens for some period. We treat such cases as two different movies.
In the analysis that follows, we compare the actual schedule to the schedules based on our model. Beginning with ex post information, we derive normative policy implications for the scheduling decisions. We assume the obligation period to be two weeks for all the movies considered. This is the minimum of the play lengths of most movies in the actual schedule. The revenue sharing terms for the movie Batman in 7 Although the actual case schedules a number of movies for only one week, we proceed with a two-week obligation period for the sake of consistency. It is clear that this extra restriction works against our comparison approaches, and our profit results will be conservative to this extent. ST5  IJ  IJ  SNEHNE  SDL  DPS  ST5  IJ  ST5  IJ  14  DPS  ST5  ST5  IJ  IJ  SNEHNE  SDL  DPS  ST5  IJ  ST5  IJ  15  IJ  ST5  DPS  B  B  HISK  B  DPS  B  IJ  HISK  IJ  16  IJ  ST5  DPS  B  B  HISK  B  DPS  B  IJ  HISK  IJ  17  IJ  LW2  DPS  B  B  HISK  B  DPS  B  LW2  HISK  IJ  18  LTK  LW2  B  IJ  PP  HISK  B  DPS  B  LW2  HISK  LTK  19  LTK  LW2  B  IJ  UHF  HISK  B  DPS  B  LW2  HISK  LTK  20  LTK  LW2  B  TH  FT8  HISK  B  DPS  B  LW2  TH  LTK  21  LTK  LW2  B  TH  FT8  LU  B  DPS  B  LW2  TH  LU  22  LTK  LU  B  TH  LW2  NES5  B  DPS  B  LW2  NES5  LU  23  RA  LIR  B  LU  LW2  NES5  B  DPS  B  LW2  NES5  LU  24  LIR  TP  B  LU  LW2  C  TP  DPS  B  LW2  C  LU  25  DPS  TP  B  RL  LW2  C  TP  DPS  B  LW2  C  RL  26  DPS  TP  B  RL  LW2  C  TP  DPS  B  LW2  C  RL  27  RL  TP  B  C  LW2  NG  TP  DPS  B  LW2  C  RL 1989 were as specified in the previous section. The house nut amount for all the screens of 84th St. Sixplex was $14,500 in 1989 (see Variety 1989). We have no public information available on the variable and fixed costs, and concession profits for the 84th St. Sixplex. Therefore, we used the financial statements of four major theatrical chains, AMC, Cineplex Odeon, United Artists, and Carmike, to examine how their cost data vary with box-office revenue. Quarterly and annual financial statements from these companies, obtained from the Internet and based on Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, indicate that the operating costs typically vary from 56% to 66% of boxoffice revenue. The concession profits vary from 30% to 40% of box-office revenue. These ranges conform with the industry standards available from other sources such as Squire (1992) . To present results for a representative case in the comparative analyses that follow, we assume operating costs of 66% and concession profits of 40%. 8 We generate cumulative net revenues for various comparison cases, which include 8
The break-up of operating costs into fixed and variable costs is not available from the financial statements. We make an assumption that one half of the operating costs is fixed cost and the other half is variable cost. Thus, for the representative case, fixed and variable costs are each 33% of the box-office revenue. In the sensitivity analysis section, we examine the robustness of our results to these assumptions, as well as our other assumptions about contract terms.
variables that vary with weekly revenues and movies, that is, concession profit, variable cost, and share of the box-office revenue. To obtain cumulative profit, we then subtract from the cumulative net revenue the cumulative fixed cost over the season which is common across all the comparison cases. To calculate the cumulative fixed cost, we use the cumulative box-office revenue for the actual case of all the movies that played at the theater during the season.
Normative Policy Versus Actual Decision
Making 3.1.1. Comparison Approach: Ex Post Data, Restricted Set of Movies. In this approach, we consider only those movies that were actually played at the theater. To compare the schedule produced by our model with the actual decisions of the exhibitor, we use ex post information concerning the revenues. We also need to predict, however, box-office gross revenues for the weeks beyond the actual play length of a movie. We fit the linear regression version of the demand model introduced in Equation (2) of the previous section after log-transforming their gross revenues. After deleting two "outlier" movies, an average adjusted R 2 was found to be 0.92 for the movies tested. 9 To generate revenue estimates for the later weeks of the movies that actually played only for one week at the theater, we use a median decay rate across all the movies shown at the theater. From here onward, we use the term "optimal restricted set schedule (approach)" to denote the schedule produced by the algorithm using the revenue data generated in the above fashion.
SilverScreener's Normative Results.
The results presented in this section were obtained by the implementation of the SilverScreener model on the empirical data collected. The optimal schedule generated by the model is given in Table 2B . A summary characterization of the results is provided in Table 3 .
Tables 2B and 3 (first two columns) suggest the following:
9
The average adjusted R 2 does not include the two outlier movies or the movies that played only for one week. The revenue of the two outlier movies first increases for a brief period and then exponentially decreases. We also do not include the movies that played for exactly two weeks, since their R 2 value is equal to one and would inflate the average R 2 .
• The use of the optimization approach estimates the multiplex exhibitor to be capable of earning a higher cumulative profit than for the actual schedule (37.7%). The substantial profitability improvement is achieved despite the fact that it is a stringent test, given the data available, of our optimization approach. Recall that we use a limited consideration set, which includes suboptimal choices of movies made by the exhibitor. We only allow double-booking for the three movies that the theater double-booked. An estimated improvement of 37.7%, therefore, attests to the potential effectiveness of our approach in rather unconstrained cases.
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• The improvement over actual decisions is achieved from two sources. One is better selection, that is, choosing the "right" movie to show, and the other is better scheduling, that is, deciding the "right" run-length of the movie chosen. As shown in Table 3 , the nature of the normative optimal policy is to choose fewer "right" movies and run them longer. (This result also held for the expanded data set described in Footnote 10.)
• The optimal schedule retains 27 movies of the 43 movies actually scheduled by the exhibitor. Thus, our model significantly improves upon actual decisions, while retaining approximately 63% of managerial choices. Managerial decisions may gradually converge with the model's recommendation as the model is used over an extended period of time. Thus, our approach seems ideally suited to situations in which the model "evolves" with usage (Weinberg 1986 ).
• The distributors' net revenue for the optimal restricted set schedule remains about the same ‫)%72.0מ(‬ as compared to the actual returns. While some distributors gain and others lose from this one theater's improved scheduling, this implies that a possibility of a 10 To provide a further test of our approach, we also ran the model on an expanded set of movies, namely all 87 movies that were released during the 1989 summer season and were listed at least once in Variety's "Top 50 List of Movies." Using an audience forecasting system based on the relationship between national (per theater) movie attendance and the Sixplex's attendance (described fully in Swami (1998) ) that had an adjusted R 2 of 0.80, an optimal schedule was generated. A summary of the results obtained is shown in the fourth column of Table 3 . As shown in the table, the results are similar in direction to that reported in the text, namely a limited number of movies (25) was chosen for showing, and these were shown for an average of 6.5 weeks. The cumulative profit improvement was estimated at 121%. "win-win" situation exists from an overall system standpoint.
To summarize, the use of optimization approaches like SilverScreener holds promise to improve managerial decisions in the movie exhibition business. The prescriptive advice to the manager, as compared to current practice, is to concentrate on a smaller number of movies, which are selected to maximize profits, and consequently to play these movies for a longer period of time.
3.1.3. Sensitivity Analyses. Gross Revenue. One of the key assumptions underlying the evaluation of the exhibitor's decision making quality presented in §2 is the deterministic knowledge of movie revenues. However, in practice, the manager would not have the ex post data available when making his/her scheduling decisions. Section 3.2 presents a two-tier approach that includes the use of ex ante predictions to capture more directly the exhibitor's decision environment and information set. However, at this stage, it is useful to examine the sensitivity of the results in the previous section to the changes in revenues from their deterministic levels. For a limited number of years, including those covered in our study, Variety published the exhibitor's forecast for box-office gross revenue for the following week for each screen in the theater of interest. Using these data, we can examine the impact of apparently judgmental forecasting errors on the optimal policy and improvement over actual decisions. A correlation analysis of the Variety forecasts with the ex post data suggests that these forecasts tend to be quite accurate, achieving an R 2 of 0.96. We used these oneweek ahead forecast data in a similar fashion to that of the restricted set approach of the previous section. Thus, for the weeks a movie played at the theater, we used the forecast data from Variety; for the weeks beyond, we used the two-parameter exponential model for prediction.
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SilverScreener was run to generate an optimal schedule, but after the optimal schedule was generated, its profitability was recalculated using the actual (ex post) revenue data. Although we observe some decrease in the percentage improvement in profit terms as compared to the optimal restricted set approach (31.4% vs. 37.7% improvement as compared to actual), the policy results are similar to those reported earlier.
In particular, only 31 of the original 43 movies were retained in the optimal schedule. As compared to the optimal ex post restricted set schedule, the most significant change was the reduction of screening slots of Batman to 16 and the scheduling of 8 as compared to 3 movies for 2-week runs. However, both schedules suggested that 18 movies run for 4 or more weeks and that, as compared to the actual schedule, fewer movies should be shown and for longer run lengths. In summary, the nature and character of the schedule using the ex ante data from Variety were quite similar to that for the ex post data, suggesting that the improved results are robust with respect to revenue streams input.
Other Parameters. The analysis on fixed and variable costs, and concession profits considers two values of operating costs, 56% and 66% (of box-office gross revenue), and concession profits, 30% and 40%, respectively. Three different cases for the split of operating costs into fixed and variable costs are considered: fully variable; 50% fixed, 50% variable; and fully fixed. Across the 12 cases of assumptions about operating costs and concession profits, the model shows a wide range of improvement over actual profits (from 18.2% to 483.9%). However, these differences are mainly due to changes in the relative levels of fixed and variable
There is always the possibility that an exhibitor has dropped a movie from the schedule just before it is about to undergo a sudden and idiosyncratic drop in box office revenue. However, this is unlikely to be a general result given the considerable success of the exponential decay model to capture a movie's revenue a few weeks after its opening Eliashberg 1996, Jedidi et al. 1998; Krider and Weinberg 1998) . Looked at on a national basis, the box office revenues for the movies in our sample did not show any systematic, unusual sales declines at the time they were dropped by this theater.
costs rather than to substantial differences in scheduling. To conduct analysis on obligation period, we treat the cumulative revenue of the play length of a movie as an indicator of its strength. We sort these data and divide them into two halves with a median split. We assume the obligation period of those movies that have cumulative revenue below the median to be lower (two weeks), and those above the median to be higher (four weeks). The results show that the added obligation period restriction causes a slight decrease in profitability as compared to the optimal restricted set approach (30.2% vs. 37.7%), but the policy results are quite comparable to earlier results. Finally, the analysis on revenue sharing terms is conducted by using a sample of revenue sharing terms used by a major theater chain in 1996. The model improves in profitability (from 15% to 38%) over actual decisions across different contract terms.
To summarize, our model leads to a robust improvement in profitability for the exhibitor under a broad range of parameter estimates, cost assumptions, contract terms, and decision-making structures. We next discuss the integrated two-tier application of our model.
SilverScreener's Two-Tier Application: An
Integrated Approach The major objective of this section is to show that our model would be an effective managerial decision aid. Toward this end, we propose an integrated application of our model, which consists of two phases: 1) Movie Selection, and 2) Adaptive Scheduling.
Tier 1: Movie Selection-Which Movies to
Play? Motivation. Before a season begins, exhibitors select a set of movies to book and develop a tentative schedule (or "master plan"). Our personal interviews with several exhibitors showed them to have keen interest in a mathematical model-based master plan because it would help them in their bidding and season planning decisions.
12 Approximately three to four months before the summer season, distributors screen 12 In fact, most exhibitors revealed that they develop a "sort-ofmaster-plan" before the start of a season. However, the plan optimization task may be too complicated to be done on a pencil-andpaper level. their movies for exhibitors at a major trade show usually held in Las Vegas. After the screening, distributors send out bid solicitations to most exhibitors. A typical bid invitation (see Squire 1992, p. 315 and pp. 344-345) contains the release date of the movie, the contract terms (i.e., obligation period and sharing terms) that vary by both movies and distributors, bid return deadline, and so on. The cover letter, which accompanies the bid invitation letter, might feature a brief synopsis of the movie, along with the name of the stars, director, producer, and writer.
Using the information about the contract terms for various movies from the distributors' bid invitation letters, and a suitable ex ante revenue prediction scheme (which could either be historical-data based, or managerial-judgment based), the exhibitor can then come up with a tentative preseason schedule for a multiplex using the model. Such a schedule can help the exhibitor decide whether or not to bid for a particular movie. The preseason schedule would reject some movies outright, either because their contract terms are too unattractive, or their estimated profit potential is not attractive enough as compared to other movies. However, in a spirit similar to CALLPLAN (Lodish 1971) and ARTS PLAN (Weinberg and Shachmut 1978) models, the exhibitor would have flexibility to override some of the model's recommendations and reschedule the season.
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Estimating Ex Ante Movie Revenues. To demonstrate how the exhibitor of 84th St. Sixplex could have developed a bidding plan for the summer of 1989, we need to show how the revenue estimates of the movies could have been derived before the summer season. To put ourselves in the exhibitor's shoes, we employ 13 Another benefit that the master plan offers comes simply from its ability to recommend the play length for a movie. This may be beneficial in the cases when the distributor's bid invitation letter contains more complicated contract terms. For example, the contract terms for a movie may contain different sets of obligation period and revenue sharing terms. The lowest value of the obligation period may have the least attractive of the three sharing terms for the exhibitor. The next higher value of the obligation period may have better sharing terms, and so on. Based on the model's recommendations, the exhibitor can examine the impact of different sets of obligation periods and the associated sharing terms on his/her profitability, and can then decide whether or not to bid, and if chosen to bid, the set of contract terms for bidding.
an ex ante revenue prediction scheme toward this end, which is based rather intuitively upon a matching of the forthcoming movies with similar movies played in this theater previously. This analogical reasoning is done using five attributes of a movie: Genre, MPAA (Motion Pictures Association of America) Rating, Sequel, Stars, and Distributor. While the exhibitor may not be aware of it, these attributes are based on previous studies such as Wallace et al. (1993) , Sawhney and Eliashberg (1996) , and Jedidi et al. (1998) , which have reported some success in forecasting revenues based on such attributes. 14 The ex ante revenue prediction scheme is explained in greater detail in Appendix 1. The scheme yields an overall R 2 ‫ס‬ 0.28 in terms of correlation between actual and predicted Summer 1989 revenues. The relatively low R 2 value reflects the difficulty associated with an a priori attribute-based revenue prediction of new movies. Previous researchers have also met with only partial success in relying on such analogical reasoning efforts (Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996) .
Bidding Plan Results. The critical output at this stage is the determination of a subset (from the consideration set) of movies on which to bid. The bidding plan is based on the above discussed ex ante revenue predictions and the SilverScreener optimization algorithm. The consideration set consists of the 43 different movies that actually played in the theater. In this case, the algorithm suggests that only 31 movies should be bid on (see Table 4A ). We include all the movies in the subset for bidding whose play length recommended by the algorithm exceeds a cut-off period. The schedule presented in Table 4A corresponds to a cut-off value of two weeks. 15 The 31 movies thus chosen by the bidding plan algorithm consist of 23 movies from the ex post analysis in §3.1.2 as well as 8 other movies. Hence, 4 movies from the ex post analysis were not chosen for bidding. 14 We do not suggest that the overall appeal of a movie can be reduced to some function of its attributes. Instead, the objective of the proposed revenue prediction scheme is to present a sample application of our model. Therefore, we do not rule out the possibility of better prediction schemes to be used in conjunction with our model in the future.
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A similar output was generated for a cut-off value of six weeks, but with fewer movies selected. If the forthcoming season's scheduling plan could be visualized as a two-dimensional (week-by-screen) matrix, then that matrix contains only "empty cells" before the bid planning process begins. After the bid plan is developed and finalized with the distributors, the exhibitor can "fill" some of those empty cells. Assuming an obligation period of two weeks, the twodimensional week-by-screen matrix for this case is shown in Table 4A . The occupied cells in the table represent the slots, which the exhibitor fills by bidding before the season. The empty cells represent slots, which can be decided during the season by either extending movies the exhibitor booked before the season or by scheduling other movies which may become available later in the season. This leads us into the second tier-adaptive scheduling-of the integrated approach.
Tier 2: Adaptive Scheduling-How Long
Should Movies Play? Motivation. In practice, exhibitors decide once a week (normally on Monday), on which movies to play starting later in the week (usually Friday) . This is an adaptive decision-making mode of behavior. Our model is capable of incorporating such weekly decisions for the rest of the schedule (i.e., filling the empty cells). In such situations, the exhibitor is likely to choose a shorter planning horizon (a time window) than the one chosen for preseason bidding because he/she will be relatively more certain of the availability and revenue potentials of the various movies. The exhibitor in fact makes weekly decisions "rolling" from one time window to another. To simulate this managerial behavior, we use the minimal information that an exhibitor has about each movie's revenue potential. After a movie plays at the theater (if it is chosen to play), and the corresponding actual revenue data becomes available, the exhibitor can update the revenue prediction model on the basis of the new data. For example, the manager may begin using SilverScreener with an eight-week time window in the first week of the season using his/her judgment of revenue stream estimates. Depending on the model's recommendation, he/she arrives at the first eight week complete scheduling decision. In the second week, however, he/she may update the revenue estimates for the next eight weeks on the basis of the actual revenue received in the first week. Based on the model's recommendation for the second to ninth week, he/she makes the second week scheduling decision. From the third week onwards, the manager could use a combination of the two-parameter estimated exponential model (for the movies that have played for two weeks) as well as managerial estimates for the prediction of revenues for the third to tenth week, and so on.
Methodology. To analyze the adaptive scheduling decisions more in line with the actual decision making, we assume that the only information available to the exhibitor about the revenue of a movie before its release is its first-week forecast. This weekly forecast is in fact published in Variety (1989); see §3.1.3. To generate predictions for the later weeks, we use a median 16 exponential decay rate (calculated across all the movies played in the 84th St. Sixplex). The idea is that with no a priori information, the executive is likely to rely on an average across all movies or a similar historical summary measure. This is in the same spirit as using a prior distribution over the decay rate. After a movie has played for one week, we fit the two-parameter exponential model using the actual data from the first week and the second week's forecast from Variety to generate predictions for the later weeks. In a similar 16 The distribution of decay rates is skewed to the right, therefore we used median instead of mean. fashion, after a movie has played for two weeks, we fit the two-parameter exponential model to the actual data of such movies.
Results. We follow the adaptive decision-making approach for the first 20 time windows (each with an eight-week time horizon), covering the entire 1989 summer season. In each of the eight-week windows, the adaptive approach, relying on forecasts, schedules consistently fewer movies than it "considers," consistent with the normative optimal policy in §3.1.2, which relies on ex post information. Although a schedule is generated for all eight weeks within a time window, it is really the first-week recommendation that is used for weekly decision making. We term the schedule obtained by stacking the first-week recommendation of all time windows as the actual implied schedule. 17 The actual implied schedule compiled from the first 20 time windows of the adaptive scheduling approach considering the cut-off value of two weeks for bidding is given in Table 4B .
The actual implied schedule results derived in an integrated manner are quite similar to the optimal schedule results derived in a one-shot manner for the 20 weeks planning horizon. 18 We find that when the cut-off criterion for bidding is two weeks (i.e., a high degree of precommitment by bidding), 43% of the estimated optimal (ex post data-based) profit improvement is retained; when the cut-off criterion is six weeks (i.e., a low degree of precommitment), 90% of the optimal profit improvement is retained. Thus, the value of using our modeling approach in an adaptive framework depends upon the quality of revenue estimates available to the management and the degree of adaptability retained in the system.
To summarize, in this section we presented an integrated two-tier application of our model. The first tier generates choices of the movies for bidding, which are then used in the second tier, an adaptive approach for the in-season weekly scheduling. In both cases, we 17 We must emphasize here that this schedule is arrived at using no hindsight revenue data.
18
A difference is that there are a few movies that are scheduled for one week because we do not impose obligation period restriction from one week to another in constructing the actual implied schedule.
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Marketing Science/Vol. 18, No. 3, 1999 367 use minimal information that is available to the exhibitor at a decision point. Our results show that the minimal information based integrated schedules mimic the policy recommendations and can achieve a level of improvement of the same order from a hindsight based optimization. The approaches are quite general in that they can incorporate a sophisticated demand prediction model, managerial judgments, or a combination of both. In the next section, we examine another intuitive decision rule (heuristic) that is consistent with the reality of the film business environment. the distributors as long as he/she has "space" to show them. However, with some element of smartness in the decisions, the exhibitor replaces only his/her worst performing movies (in terms of expected revenue) at any decision point.
Analysis and Results.
To abstract from issues relating to forecasting, under this scenario we now return to the assumptions of §3.1.2. That is, we use the ex post (hindsight) data used in the optimal restricted set approach. This level is representative of the cases in which the manager has access to a sophisticated system that produces "perfect" information about the revenue of a movie. "All" could be replaced by "the most favored" distributors.
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Though we generate the revenue data set being used before arrivThe results obtained from the application of this heuristic are presented in the last column of Table 3 . The exhibitor following the distributors' pressure heuristic performs much worse on the profitability criterion (relative to the optimal case). 21 The decrease in profit results generally from a huge proportion of the movies that are scheduled for shorter play lengths, that is, in the opposite direction to that suggested by the optimal policy. On the other hand, the manager comes close to the actual case in profit terms. Given that the total number of movies scheduled under the maintaining good relationship heuristic are equal to those in the actual case, these results are interesting because they provide a possible explanation to the short average play lengths by the manager in the actual case. In other words, perhaps the 84th St. Sixplex manager was predisposed to show the 43 movies of all the distributors he/she had good relations with, and, therefore, quickly replaced the already playing movies in many instances.
In summary, our results show that the level of profitability that a manager might achieve in an application setting depends importantly on the quality of information and a good scheduling algorithm that takes a long-term view into account. We find that if the replacement rule is ad hoc, then even good information cannot bring extra value to the manager, as exemplified by the distributor pressure heuristic with ex post information.
Conclusion: Discussion, Limitations, and Future Research
Like other retail space allocation decisions, the choice of which movies to schedule in a theater is a complex one, involving trade-offs among numerous alternatives and with implications for both current and future ing at the schedules, the heuristic is applied as if the manager knows the data corresponding to a decision point only at that decision point. Thus, this is a myopic heuristic, which does not take into account the future realizations of revenues. 21 Though the scheduling decisions are arrived at following the distributors' pressure heuristic, the profit calculations are based on the combination of ex post actual revenue data and the two-parameter exponential prediction model of optimal restricted set approach.
profits. The movie industry poses some particularly challenging opportunities for managers (and for modelers) as new products are introduced every week, and the attractiveness of existing products decays systematically and usually rapidly over time. Moreover, contract terms are complex and designed in ways to favor the distributors, making the choice of the most profitable set of movies to schedule difficult for the exhibitors. Using an integer programming model, the special structure of the underlying problem, an analogous production scheduling problem, and a powerful, but readily available, mathematical programming language, we are able to structure the exhibitor's problem and investigate different types of managerial behavior with various kinds of available information.
Managerial Impact
Using the most representative data, SilverScreener appears to lead to a 37.7% improvement in profit when the exhibitor is restricted to the movies actually scheduled. We further presented an integrated two-tier application of our model to show how a manager might use our model. Using no hindsight data, the application shows that the implementation of our model has the potential to significantly improve managerial decision making. In a real world application, the system could benefit even more from additional inputs from an experienced manager. Finally, we studied a behavioral heuristic, which shows that no matter how good the information is, the exhibitor could lose money if he/ she tries to please all the distributors in the market. This lends further support to our normative policy that the exhibitors need to be more selective about their scheduling decisions and should run their movies longer instead of replacing them quickly. Besides the benefits of the model discussed in its applications, the model also offers other potential managerial gains. For example, the model can be used as a scenario analysis tool. Using the model, the manager can examine the impact of different contract terms for the same movie. A related managerial benefit from the model is its availability as a marketing information system. The model can easily be adapted to provide a summary of potential profits to be obtained from different distributors/movies. When compared with similar data over previous seasons, these summaries can provide a more concrete way of estimating the cost of honoring relationships with the distributors. Overall, the model provides a more profitable way of scheduling movies.
An important area of future research deals with the issues involved with the manager-model interface. How will the manager use the schedules suggested by the model and how will this change over time? In the case of ARTS PLAN, the manager extensively used the ARTS PLAN model as it reduced uncertainty and saved time, but the manager also made personal choices in scheduling and revised model forecasts. In the movie industry, the theater owner has ongoing relationships with the distributors, and likely will not make decisions on a single transaction basis. The availability of the model both provides an optimal schedule, and an estimate of the value of honoring a relationship as compared to making a more profitable, but perhaps short-term decision. Will such information change the nature of the relationship over time, and the way decisions are made? It would also be intriguing to examine the impact of contract terms on exhibitor's profitability and scheduling. Present contracting practices were designed in an environment quite different from the one existing now. Early results from Swami et al. (1998) suggest that a win-win (distributorexhibitor) situation could result under some conditions.
Model Extensions
A limitation of the current research regards the issue of screen capacity, which is assumed equal in the current formulation. The screen capacity is, of course, a critical variable to the problem formulation only if the demand of a movie exceeds screen capacity. Indeed, the primary reason for the exhibitor to have different screen sizes is that the attendance varies for different movies and having different screen sizes increases scheduling flexibility (while saving capital costs in the original construction of the theater). The first major decision variable to be affected by different screen sizes is the multiple screenings (e.g., double booking) of a movie. This is usually done for blockbuster movies whose demand is expected to exceed the capacity of the highest capacity screen. However, such movies are rare in a season. The second variable is the allocation of movies on screens in the beginning and switching movies between screens later. A movie may be switched from a higher to a lower capacity screen because of its depleting demand and the availability of a more attractive movie for the higher capacity screen. The opposite case may also occur sometimes (although infrequently) when a movie's demand builds by wordof-mouth in the later weeks.
The nonequal screen capacity issues could be addressed by modifying the original formulation of the problem as follows. 22 First, a new binary variable, x jisw , which equals 1 if movie j is shown for i weeks on screen s starting in week w, and 0 otherwise, needs to be defined. The corresponding profit, P jisw , depends on the variable GROSS ju (see Equation (1)), that is, the relevant box-office gross revenue, which would have to be modeled differently for the different capacity case. In this case, it would have to be recast as min (MAX s , GROSS ju ), where MAX s is the maximum weekly revenue any movie can earn on screen s if that screening room is filled to its capacity.
23 Different sets of constraints would be needed to ensure the following conditions: (1) obligation periods of all the scheduled movies are met; (2) a movie, if scheduled, is shown only in consecutive weeks (i.e., no job splitting); (3) the total number of movies scheduled in any week is less than, or equal to, the total number of screens in the multiplex; (4) only one movie is scheduled on a given screen in a given week; and (5) a movie, if scheduled, is not shown on more than one screen in a given week. Finally, the release and due date constraints could also be added for the generality of the model. It is evident that the above formulation would be quite complex. Algorithms to solve parallel machines with unequal capacity scheduling problems depend upon the characteristics of the particular problem and usually involve heuristic or near optimal approaches (Sawik 1982 , Pinedo 1984 , Pinedo and Shaw 1992 . 23 In our empirical application, we do not have information available on the MAX S variable.
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Since capacity in the movie exhibition context can be operationalized as number of seats available per week or maximum number of tickets that can be sold per week, a heuristic approach to address the nonequal seats available in various screening rooms is to equalize them implicitly by assuming that the number of shows per week in the rooms with lower capacity can be increased proportionally.
In practice, however, it appears that switching between screens is mainly decided on the basis of the rankordering of the movies. Thus, the different screen capacity related decisions seem to follow the decision about "which-movies-to-show." Moreover, in the absence of the right kind of data for empirical application, we find that the equal capacity screens assumption, which provides "which-movies-to-show" and "how-long-to-play-them" solutions, gives us a reasonable starting point for the current problem.
The current research can be extended to address the competitive issues from a strategic viewpoint. For example, a theater's bidding strategy for a film might be affected by the anticipated competitive behavior of the other theaters. 25 At a consumer level, to examine the possibility, if any, of the effect of the competitive behavior on demand, let us consider a two-theater (A and B) situation. The demand of a movie at theater A may be different for the cases when both A and B are playing the movie than when only A is playing it, if A and B are sufficiently close in distance. At a national level, Krider and Weinberg (1998) have developed game theoretic equilibrium strategies for motion picture release timing. Incorporating such an approach into a multiplex owner's weekly decision making would be a challenging task. If the exhibitor has an estimate of such effects on demand, either subjectively or based on some historical database, then availability of the SilverScreener model as a scenario analysis tool may help the exhibitor examine the effect of competition on profitability. While the above strategic competitive issues pose some interesting future research questions, they do not fit in the decision support objectives of the For example, if two screens are available, one with 200 seats and the other with 400 seats, the problem can be "equalized" by increasing the number of play times in the first screen by a factor of two. Once the problem is solved as originally formulated, in a second step, the exhibitor can solve in a relatively straightforward manner, using cost/benefit analysis, the problem of assigning movies to screens and determining the number of times movies should be shown per week. 25 To some extent, ownership of exhibitors by motion picture studios (e.g., Sony Pictures now owns Cineplex-Odeon and Loews theaters) limits the extent of competition. current study. Moreover, from an empirical standpoint, it appears difficult to predict the impact of competition on demand parameters. In sum, therefore, we implicitly assume that the competitive effects, if they exist, are summarized in demand parameters or affect randomly the error term in the demand function, and leave to future research the incorporation of competitive effects on demand.
In conclusion, in this paper we present a mathematical model, SilverScreener, which is aimed at helping exhibition managers make better decisions in a complex environment. An integrated 2-tier application of the model, involving movie selection plans and adaptive scheduling approaches, shows how the model could assist the multiplex exhibitors in making profitable scheduling decisions. At a broad level, our model would benefit managers in two different ways. One is by helping the managers improve their bidding and scheduling techniques. That is, the model could help the manager adopt a new decision-making style which is based on an analytical approach. The second is by helping the manager perform the same scheduling task in a more efficient way. The availability of a computer-based algorithm may automate part of the scheduling process and help save management's time. This benefit would be especially valuable for the managers of theater chains who have to make such scheduling decisions for a number of theaters on a regular basis.
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Appendix 1: Revenue Prediction Scheme for Master Plan Development
Description of Estimation Data
Assuming that a typical manager has access to at least as much historical data as those that appear in Variety, we propose an ex ante revenue prediction scheme, which uses the previous year's data to generate revenue estimates of forthcoming movies. It is clear that this scheme does not suffer from any hindsight effects. In the bidding plan stage, we use the same movie consideration set as that for the optimal restricted set. In generating revenue estimates for 1989 in 26 This work was supported in part by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and was begun while Jehoshua Eliashberg was a Visiting Scholar at the University of British Columbia. The authors thank the three anonymous reviewers, the area editor and editor of Marketing Science, David Williams, and Eunkyu Lee for their helpful comments. our bidding plan example, we use the data from 84th St. Sixplex for the year 1988 for the corresponding season of 27 weeks.
27

Demand Model
We use the two-parameter exponential model for revenue prediction, which is the same as the demand equation presented in §2 and is restated here for convenience:
jw j
where GROSS jw denotes box-office gross revenue of Movie j in Week w of the movie's run (w ‫ס‬ 0, 1, 2, . . .), ␣ j Ͼ 0 and b j Ͻ 0 are opening and decay factors respectively of movie j and ⑀ ϳ normal (0, r 2 ). Our use of the term revenue prediction implies estimation of ␣ and b for different movies. Alternatively, a manager can use some other revenue prediction model depending on the level of sophistication required for the manager's situation. A simple model could be in terms of percentage declines. For example, a manager might say, "I expect Movie X to open at a and decline at b% every week." It is clear that we capture open and decline by ␣ and b, respectively, in our estimation scheme. The revenue data of 1988 movies were collected to estimate ␣ and b's (using Equation (2) for the corresponding movies of the Summer season of 1989).
28
Movies Classification Procedure
We collect data on some key attributes (to be described later) of both 1988 and 1989 movies. The objective of this data collection procedure is to classify the movies according to these variables. We use a genrebased approach for classification purposes. Once such a classification is done, we can predict the revenue for a 1989 movie with certain attributes by "matching" the movie with similar movies from 1988. By collecting the relevant data and matching it with the previous year's movies, we attempt to mimic the managerial behavior of the following type: When faced with a new movie, the manager says, "Last year, the movies of this type generated X dollars on average in their first week, and dropped by Y percent every week on average. Therefore, I expect this movie to open at X and drop at the rate of Y every week."
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Attributes
The first attribute is the genre of the movie. We include the following genres in our analysis: Action, Comedy, Drama, Horror, Crime, and Science Fiction. The second attribute, MPAA Rating, captured the Motion Picture of America Association's (MPAA) classification of the movie as R, PG, or PG-13. The Sequel attribute (Yes/No variable) indicates whether the movie was a sequel or not. We used the Blockbuster Entertainment Guide (Castell 1996) to gather data on the above variables. The fourth attribute, Stars (Yes/No variable), indicates 27 Though a few data used for estimation are from the years preceding 1988 (e.g., in case of sequels), most of the prediction data are used from the year 1988. 28 We collected data on 44 movies of the 1988 season, similar to 43 from the 1989 season. We also collected data for a few movies from 1987. 29 Notice that since the year-to-year variations would be fixed across all movies, they would not affect the schedule generation process. whether the movie included major stars (as classified by Quigley's Motion Picture Almanac; see Klain 1990) or not. Finally, the Distributor attribute (Yes/No variable) indicates whether the movie was being distributed by a major distributor or not. The following distributors are recognized as major distributors: Warner Brothers, TriStar, Touchstone, Buena Vista, Walt Disney, Paramount, and United Artists. Notice that the above five attributes of a movie can be collected ex ante and are assumed to be known to the exhibitor at the time of receiving the bid invitation letter.
Estimation of Demand Parameters
We estimate the two parameters of the demand model for the various movies of 1989 using the corresponding 1988 movie estimates. The following scheme applies to all the movies that are neither blockbusters (e.g., Indiana Jones) nor sequels (e.g., Lethal Weapon II): 1) If, for any 1989 movie, there is a unique corresponding 1988 movie (i.e., matches on all five attributes and is the only such movie), then we use the ␣ and b of that movie as estimates of the 1989 movie.
2) If there are multiple movies from 1988 that match on all five attributes, then we use the average of ␣ and b's of all such movies as estimates of the 1989 movie.
3) If there is no movie from 1988 that matches the 1989 movie on all five attributes, then we examine whether there are movies in 1988 data that match on the next four attributes (including Genre and MPAA) and use the relevant averages of their estimates. If not, then we match on the next three variables, and proceed similarly as before. We therefore adopt a stepped approach and match the movies next on Genre and MPAA, then on Genre alone, and use the relevant averages.
4) Finally, if there is no movie in 1988 data set that matches the 1989 movie even on genre, then we use averages of all the movies in 1988 data set. 30 In this case, we envision the manager as saying, "Faced with a completely different movie about which I have no specific classifying information, I'll use the estimates that are based on all the movies in my last year's information set."
The following scheme is used for blockbuster movies, that is, those movies that involve huge production budgets, and are supported by heavy upfront advertising (e.g., Jurassic Park, Independence Day, or Titanic in recent years). It is therefore easy to see that in the 1989 data set for the 84th St. Sixplex, only Batman and Indiana Jones can be treated as blockbusters. This is also reflected in their longer play lengths and double booking status in the actual schedule. For the blockbuster movies of 1989, we choose as their estimates the maximum ␣ and minimum b (assuming a negative value of b) of all the movies from 1988. In this case, therefore, the manager uses the following rule, "Since these are blockbuster movies, I expect them to open like the movie with the best opening last year, and sustain like the movie with the strongest legs (i.e., minimum decay rate) from last year."
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This occurs for the movie SING that has Music as its Genre according to the Blockbuster Entertainment Guide (Castell 1996) .
For a sequel movie, we use as its estimates the ␣ and b of its immediate predecessor from the most recent previous year. The predecessors of Friday the 13th Part VIII and A Nightmare on Elm St. 5 are available from 1988 data. We use 1987 data for the estimates of License to Kill and Lethal Weapon II. The estimates of some movies are not available under this scheme because either the movie was not played by the theater, or the predecessor was released more than two years ago. In such cases, their estimates are based on their Genre type attributes.
